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What Role Should the Militarv Plav;» 
O ne conrenrious ropic of debarc is 
whether or nor militaries should even be 
involved in mine acrion and if so, whar exact-
ly their role should be. Because rhe level of 
military involvement in mine action currently 
varies widely from region to region , there are 
many different views on the subject. There are 
rhose rhar believe their role should be limited, 
like Hugh Morris of Mine Tech International, 
who says, "I don'r rhink rhc military have a 
role in mine action orher rhan in a conflict sir-
uarion where rhey can nor bring in commercial 
[organizations) or NCOs. I rhink rhe military 
have a role to secure their own force protec-
tion aims, be able ro allow movement of their 
forces and maybe movement of civilians and 
movement of refugees. Bur when ir is a post-
conflict siruarion, rhe military should move on 
to other tasks, because they're nor civil admin-
istrators and they're nor geared to do rasks of 
a humanitarian mine clearing nature. Ir 
requires a lot of men and a lor of rime, and I 
d on 'r believe any military has the time to do 
ir. So I don' t rhink rhey have a role in a post-
I ll I 11 [ l l~[ OllL I I 
conflict siruarion in any counrry in rhe world 
ro clear land mines." 1 H e srresses rhat although 
rhe milirary, being paid for by rhc govern-
men t, may be able to do such tasks for less 
money, if rhey are nor p roperly trained and 
knowledgeable on international standards, 
then they will nor be as effective as commer-
cial or non-governmenral organizations. 
Morris says, "The milira1y have nothing bur a 
military role in clearing mines, and rhen your 
NCOs and commercial companies are rhe 
ones who will ridy up in a post-conflict situa-
tion, unless there is money pur into rhe mili-
tary, and they'd have ro adhere ro rhe 
lnrernario nal Mine Actio n Standards 
[IMAS)."t 
Chuck Meadows of PeaceTrees 
Vietnam believes that rhe milirary should be 
more involved in the actual clearance of 
mines: "In my view, any milirary in any coun-
try, rheir role should be in rhc removal of any 
mines ... rhar rhey may have used or pur down 
in any con flier rhar rhey have been engaged in. 
Then, in their own countries, I think rhey 
would be the appropriate ones to assist in the 
removal of any land mines rhatany insurgenrs, 
rebels or terrorists, or anybody else have in facr 
pur in rhe ground ."2 John Wilkinson of 
RONCO also sees r:he role of rhe milirary as 
one of involvement in clearance, bur in addi-
tion he emphasizes rhar their involvement in 
this aspect of mine acrion is more appropriate 
rhan in orher aspecrs such as mine risk educa-
tion (MRE): " ... I think thar the mine acrion 
in terms of the removal of rhe mines as 
opposed to MRE is probably more a role for 
rhe military to play."3 
Another view is thar the military 
should mainly be involved in rhe "behind-the-
scenes" of mine action, such as providing 
training, equipment, logistics and planning. 
Paddy Blagden, an independent consultant of 
lnrernarional Mine Acrion believes rhis ro be 
besr rype of involvemenr in mine acrion for 
the military: "There's so much that rhe mili-
tary can do to help rhe NCOs even wirhour 
getting near a minefield, and rhar I'd be far 
more happy wirh , because 1 don 'r like seeing 
soldiers being pushed into doing mine clear-
ance because ir's parr of their military dury."4 
Collaborators or Competitors;» 
W ith the military working in many 
areas alongside non-military mine action prac-
titioners, one might wonder if they see one 
another as collaborators or competitors. The 
overall feeling in the mine action communiry 
seems to be rhar the military is nor in compe-
tition wirh NGOs and commercial organiza-
tions. One reason for this cired by a number 
of non-miliraty mine acrion practitioners is 
rhat NCOs and commercial companies often 
hire ex-milirary personnel for rheir mine 
acrion work. John Wilkinson sums ir up as 
fo llows: " ... [L]et's face ir-many of the people 
we hire and rhat everybody else hires are for-
mer military, especially to run our field opera-
tions. So I've never rhought thar rhere was a 
sort of hard and fasr division between rhe rwo; 




I think rhere's different areas of interest, different areas of access, dif-
ferent areas of understandin g, bur all of rhem can be bridged and can 
be made ro work in a complementary man ner."3 
Some non-military mine action workers eire particular cases 
in which rheir organizations are working wirh rhe military in a harmo-
n ious way. As an example of how rhe rwo can work hand-in-hand 
Paddy Blagden rells a srory of a Japanese NCO working in Thailand 
alongside one of rhe Thailand Mine Acrion Cenrer's (TMAC's) 
Humanira.rian M ine Acrion Unirs (HMAUs), which are composed of 
members of rhe Thai army. The HMAU was often unable to use irs 
machines, so rhe NGO would borrow them, making sure that when 
rhe machines were returned, rhe HMAU could carry on irs work wirh 
a fully fueled and serviced machine. Thus, rhe NCO's deminers could 
use a piece of equipment too expensive for them to own for only the 
cost of fuel and servicing. "And rhis synergistic relationship worked-
we gor enormous assistance fro m the army as a res ult,"4 Blagden says. 
John Wilkinson says char when RO NCO firsr began work-
ing with the U .S. military in Afghanistan, they weren' r sure how to 
work rogerher, parrly because rhe military didn 't really understand rhe 
process of demining and irs value. lr didn'r rake long, rhough, as he 
explains: " ... IA]s soon as we starred working, rhey understood rhe 
value of dcmining, when we started finding unexploded ordnance and 
landmines that have been missed by rhe more cursory 'mine-clearing' 
rechniques."3 Bur this progress was all bur lost when rhar unit's rora-
rion ended, and RONCO had ro start over with rhe incoming unir. 
Soon, however, RONCO's value was recognized: " ... [Bjy the rime rhe 
third unit came in, our presence had been established sufficien rly long, 
and there was enough histoty of whar we'd been clearing and to what 
effect rhar rhe arriving unir immediately said, 'We wanr you guys to 
sray, we wanr you ro conrinue doing whar you're doing.' ... [T)hey 
understood the role rhar we were playing for rhem even rhough we 
were nor of rhem."3 
What Does the Mllitarv Bring to the Table;» 
So whar advanrage, if any, is rhere to having rhe mil itary 
involved in mine action' As in rhe example of Thailand mentioned 
above, some mili taries may have rools at their disposal rhat are too 
expensive fo r NCOs themselves to purchase. As John W ilkinson 
points our, "rhey have much larger resources; rhey have the trained 
EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] people."3 If militaries and non-
military organizations can work our ways ro share these tools, as in the 
TMAC example, such a partnership can be murually benefi cial to 
borh. 
Militaries also may have some more figu rative "tools" from 
which non-military originations could benefit. According to Chuck 
Meadows, "The biggest tool rhey would have is jusr 
experience and training, because in the militaries char I've been associ-
ated with, parr of rhar organ i1.arion are EO D folks and engineers that 
are trained ro do rhar, whereas an NCO by ourselves might nor have 
char personal experi ence."2 On the orher hand, J ohn Wilkinson says, 
"[ l] r's more of an organizational concept thar rhey have to bring rather 
rhan experience ... . [Y]ou've gor a hierarchical sysrem in rhe milirary, 
which, when iris given a mission or undertakes a mission, will turn ro 
and pur a lor of resources aga inst and focus irs arrenrion on it. l think 
that organizarional structure is something rhar we in the NCO com-
munity could benefit from in terms of how we approach things ... . So 
l think rhar more whar r:hey have to bring is the organizational 
approach and rhe way rhey focus logistics and effort on a particular 
rask."3 
Facing the Challenges 
Though militaries can be a valuable resource if they use 
rheir assets to mount collaborative efforts wirh non-military groups, 
there arc srill a number of challenges when involving rhe military in 
mine action. Perhaps one of rhe mosr fundamental is rhe opinions and 
prejudices rhar each group has towards rhe orher. Hugh Morris nores 
thar " ... soldiers more often rhan nor consider civilians ro be a neces-
sa•y evil and so are uncomfortable in rhei r presence." 1 Also, even 
though non-mili rary organizations may have more experience in 
humanitarian roles, soldiers may rcsisr learning from civilians. As a for-
mer military member himself, Paddy Blagden understands rhis atti-
rude: " ... ! can rell you as an ex-military that no military man likes to 
learn from [civilians] .... The lasr rhing you wanr is a rree-hugger com-
ing alo ng and telling you how to do your business."4 However, he 
thinks rhe military men would do well to overcome rheir unwilling-
ness ro learn from civilians, "because I rhink rhey would learn quite a 
lor.. .. I rhink thar if rhey can overcome rhis unwill ingness by realizing 
rhar rhey will save lives if rhey learn from people who are mine clear-
ing the whole ri me as professionals, rhen I think ir'll help enormously. 
If they won 't, then I'm afraid they've got to learn rhe ways rhar we d id 
(i.e., by making a large number of mistakes), bur rhar is a very pain ful 
process, and quire a lot of people can directly suffer as a result. "4 On 
the orher hand, as Mr. Wilkinson arriculares, non-military organ iza-
tions can be jusr as guilty of such prejudice: " ... [I] r requires a change 
of arrirude and a change of understanding on rhe parr of the military. 
lr also in some ways requires a change in arrirude on the parr of rhe 
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way rhings are going in terms of military presences, military interests, 
people working basically on either side of the wire from each other, 
rhar makes very little sense."3 Paddy Blagden agrees: "I agree fully ... 
char NGOs sometimes dislike soldiers as much as the other way round, 
bur ir depends very much on personalities wirhin both organiza-
rions."5 The firsr step to successful cooperation is for both sides to 
swallow rheir pride and be willing to admir that the other has a lot to 
offer. T his step will probably be aided enormously by the fact rhar a 
lor of NGOs and commercial organizations are comprised of some for-
mer military themselves, wh ich should create opportunities to initial-
ly bridge the gaps between the two groups. 
Another problem when mili taries become engaged in mine 
action is rhar rhey ofren have different priorities from the NCOs and 
commercial groups. Hugh Morris describes his experience wirh prior-
ities differing from rhe miliraty's: " ... [B]e we NGO or commercial, we 
clear mines to the International Mine Acrion Standards, and that 
imposes upon us a number of rules and a number of qualiry assurance 
checks .... None of those rules apply ro rbc military, and rhe military 
will clear mines as an expedient means of creating a camp, gerring ro a 
target, or gerring through a minefield barricr."l Because of these stan-
dards, demining often requires more rime and more paperwork rhan 
rhe m ilitary is used to. If they don't understand the reasoning behind 
such regulations, they can be turned off by rhe way professional mine 
action organizations carry our demining. John W ilkinson states, "In 
many ways, a lot of dem in ing, when a military person looks at it, it's 
kind of like, 'Geeze, it's a huge reporting structure; ir's relatively slow-
er rhan mine clearance; we're nor going to be here that long'-rhose 
kind of things. And rhcn on rhe ocher side of rhe wire, when an NGO 
looks ar rhe military, ir's kind of like, 'You guys arc ignoring roo m uch 
of the threat; you're just moving through and moving on,' ... and 
again, we' re both doing the same rhing, ... ir's jusr a different approach 
ro doing ir. .. . "3 This remark also rouches on another issue when rhc 
m ilir:uy gers involved in mine action: cimelines. As menrioncd before 
with RONCO's work in Afghan istan, limited engagement times ofren 
mean rhar mine acrion practitioners lose ground wirh militaries when 
units change, having w re-establish their rapport with rhe incoming 
soldiers and possibly re-explain their work. Paddy Blagden reaffirms 
this problem: "The slight trouble with [militaries] is rhar although 
they are initially pretry well-trained, as with mosr army units there's 
q uite a large amount of rurnover. "4 T o overcome th is problem, John 
Wilkinson says, " I rhink each has ro recognize rhe oth er's planning 
rimcline and its areas of primary interest .... I think it's an issue of com-
ing closer together and people starring to better understand what each 
other does, how they do ir and why rhey do it rhe way rhey do. "3 
M il itaries arc also sometimes reluctant to share information 
with non-military personnel, which can create difficulties when trying 
ro work together in mine action. John W ilkinson describes this ten-
dency: " ... [Y]ou've always got the issue of rhc m ilitary has a classifica-
tion system and that, for operational security, they ofren don't share 
information . 1 chink sometimes it's carried a little further than ir needs 
to be or should be."3 T his is probably one of the more difficult prob-
lems to overcome because militaries have an inherent level of secrecy 
to carry on their work. As H ugh Morris explains, there is "a form of 
fear by various m ili taries that the various weapons rhar [arc] dropped 
[are] classified weapons, and if they [haven't] exploded, then we as 
non-military personnel should nor see these weapons." 1 Yet Morris 
also chinks that the miliraty's tendency for elusiveness doesn't always 
hinder information sharing: " ... [l]n some cases where it is not a con-
tentious area, rhc military are pretty good at giving information to the 
United Nations Mine Action C enters [UN MACs] to pass on ro peo-
ple like us; but in other areas, they become quire rericenr because 
they've dropped weapons that they don' t wanr us ro see how it worh. 
So there the synergy is not always that simplc." 1 Morris cites Kosovo 
as an example of a place where information sharing with the military 
is currently not bad, but he admits that his organization did meet with 
some resistance when first trying to ob tain this information from the 
milirary. 
Improving Militarv/Non-Militarv Cooperation 
Obviously, there is great potential for military and 
non-military personnel to complement one anorher in mine 
action. There are a number o f cases in countries worldwide that 
demonstrate such partnership is nor only possible, but also quite ben-
eficial. However, mosr would say thar rhere IS still room 
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for improvemcnr. What suggestions do mem bers of rhe NCO 
and commercial sectors of mi ne acrion have for improving 
chis relationship? 
Many mine action practitioners realize char there is a differ-
ence between the military and non-military approaches to mine 
action. Military minefield b reach ing or even what rhey sometimes call 
"mine cl earance" are not rhe same as demin ing, and mine action p rac-
titioners think rhe miliraty needs ro understand rhe differences 
between rhem and why demining is so imporram. John Wilki nson 
states, " ! think the military needs to better understand what demining 
is ... and rhis requires a change of attitude frankly on rhe part of the 
m ilitary. W e still run into situations where people say, 'Well, we don 't 
do demining, we do mine clearance.' Well yeah, but, when you're sit-
ring in a minefield, you'd better do demining, or when you' re sitting 
in a field of UXO, you'd better do demining."3 Because military and 
no n-miliraty organ izations often have different goals in mind when 
doing their respective types of clearance, rhey may nor understand why 
the other party rakes a cerrain approach ro ir; militaries may believe 
that mine action is roo time-consum ing, wh ile mine action profession-
als think the military overlooks much of rhe problem. The bottom 
line, accord ing to Mr. Wilkinson, is "we're both d oing the same 
thing- we're both removing m ines and detecting and hopefully p ick-
ing up UXO, ir's just a d ifferent approach to doing it .... "3 
The d isadvantage thar seems to be most agreed upon is that 
many militaries getting involved in demining are not trained accord-
ing to the internationally recognized standards. Chuck Meadows 
expresses this as one of Peace Trees Viernam's major obstacles: "For us, 
the biggest challenge is training. lr's ensu ring the initial training for 
rhe folks have been at the United Nations standa rds."2 Pad dy Blagden 
calls fo r rh e m il itary to " ... carry our clearance to International Mine 
Action Standards .... I would say that until rhe m ilitary are capable of 
doing th is, I wouldn' t like ro see them carry out all that much demi-
ning, except in emergency situations, and th e reason is because in any 
one m ine-affected narion, rhere must be one national mine action pro-
gram controlled either centrally, or regionally b ur where each region 
is integrated with rhe other regions. (I]f you want to get a complete 
picture of rhe mine problem in any counrry, it is nor easy and you 
have to have a central organ ization ... fill ing in the database and pro-
ducing the rhrear maps and all rhe rest of ir. And if you get an army 
working off on tl1e side, not provid ing information into this database, 
bur having a little database of its own, which may not be compatible 
with IMSMA [rhe Information Management System for Mine 
Action], then you'll end up with information that is nor getting into 
the central, national mine plan. And if that quality assurance is not 
done in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards, 
you're really nor quire sure of what's going on."4 
Mr. Blagden cites the lack of following standards for major 
prob lems with dcm in ing in Iran, " ... where although areas have been 
cleared by rhe army, there have been so many accidenrs char rhe con-
tractors working there require the work to be done again by a proper 
mine clearance conrractor. What a waste of time and a waste of funds! 
If rhe work was done properly beforehand chen ir would have been 
alrighr. "4 H e also expressed his concern for the lack of safety of mili-
taty deminers who do nor follow these standards: "I am still though 
vety saddened when I hear of accidents amo ng the military. I'm espe-
c ially saddened when those accidents involve more rhan one person in 
an explosion, unless ir was an anti-tank or ami-vehicle m ine, in which 
case, ir's qu ire li kely to happen that way, provided rhe people were in 
a vehicle. T he reason for this is that when six peop le are hurt because 
rhey were all looking at an anti-personnel mine and somebody was 
rrying to pur a pin in it or at least sore of make it safe, I realize then 
rhat rhere was no dcmining d iscipline raking place at rhe site, rhar the 
safety regulations were being rorally ignored, that all the safety dis-
ranees char are compulsory for humanitarian deminers were being also 
ignored, and that as a result , valuable human lives were, to be honest, 
squandered, and I think char's a great piry .... "4 H e does believe, 
though , that militaries are starting to recognize the imporrance of fol-
lowing rhe example ser by non-mil itary mine action practitioners: " .. .I 
think eventually they will come around to being much nearer ro rhe 
NGOs' way of doing th ings and the commercial com panies' way of 
doing thi ngs. They are already in many cases adopting rhings like the 
l nrernarional M ine Action Standards ... [and] they are using the man-
agemenr software, IMSMA ... . "4 H opefully this trend will continue so 
that the integration of m ilitary and civilian deminers can be stream-
lined for improved cooperation. 
Although they may be reluctanr ro do so, m ilitaries should 
be more will ing to learn from the mine action communiry. H ugh 
Morris poinrs our thar because m ine action practitioners do demining 
full-rime, rhe military would be wise to learn from them: " .. . [S]oldiers 
that use mine detectors are trained in rhe usc of the m ine detector and 
they mighr use it fo r at rhe most five or six percenr of their time on an 
operation, whereas a commercial deminer ... uses a mine detector for 
eight hours a d ay every single day of his life in-theatre ... . " 1 Paddy 
Blagden is also a proponent of rhis idea: " .. . 1 don' t believe that armies 
who try to do humanitarian dem ining look sideways enough ar rhe 
h umanitarian mine clearing NGOs and commercial companies who 
do the job full- ri me. Because I th ink they would learn quire a lot .. .. 
(T]here have been considerable developments in rhe procedures and 
equipmenr available to NCOs, and I am constantly telling armies ... 
that rhey would be very wise to look at the kinds of equipments that 
are being used, and in fact, quire a lot of them are sensible enough to 
have done so already."4 
Another suggestion for improved cooperation is for the mil-
itary to provide supporr to rhe mine action community in matte rs the 
military may be better suited for rhan NGOs or commercial organiza-
tions and vice versa. Chuck Meadows, for example, believes " .. . the 
improvement is really one of being supportive of each other's goals in 
what we're doing. And in our case, that support is providing whatev-
er the necessary assets. For us rhat means financial assets, ir means 
equipment-it's worki ng rogerher in a partnership where there is 
understand ing rhat the hosr nation is still in charge, but being sup-
portive of what rheir needs are .... [I]t's nor a matter of manpower, ir's 
a matter of training and rhen being able to provide the necessaty 
equipment in cooperation with the other government officials that 
oversee thar work and efforrs."2 Paddy Blagden also suggests ways for 
the military to assist mine action practitioners: " ... I bel ieve rhe mili-
tary can help the NGO community immensely. T hey have equip-
ment, they have transport; they have barracks; rhcy have training areas. 
None of these things rhe NGOs have in nearly the same quantity . .. . I 
believe char rhere arc lots of army barracks thar are available rhar could 
make very good NGO headquarte rs-just let them have a corner of 
the barracks-and there are a lot of army training areas, which NGOs 
need for training themselves. It's very hard find ing a training area .... "4 
Such assets would be incredibly beneficia l for NCO or com mercial 
groups and are a way for the military to help without having to com-
mit irs own people where it may nor have the time, training o r logis-
tics ro do so. 
Along the lines of providing support but nor necessarily 
"on-th e-ground " manpower, some in the mine action community 
propose that m ilitary cooperation be more on rhe administrative side. 
Hugh Morris has had experiences wirh MincTech in which this type 
of cooperation has worked wel l. " .. . I do know of places where liaison 
with the militaty at the UN MAC level is very good, and that is where 
ir should rake place. And th is is where the military should be encour-
aged to open up to the people in the m ine action centers and mine 
action center managers should be selected in their ability ro get on 
with and operate alongside rhe milirary."l He continues, " I think that 
we can work particularly well together, and rhar should be encouraged 
ar rhe highest possible level, and I think this should be something that 
should be pur together p rior to rhe nexr war, that civilian organiza-
tions,NGOs arc brought in straight away to work alongside the mili-
tary, opera ring in support of rheir main aim, which again is force p ro-
tection, and then we can get on with our hu manitarian roles of clear-
ing up rhe problem fo r the local population." 1 
Conclusion 
I n many countries throughout rhe world, NGOs and com-
mercial demining companies are finding themselves having to coexist 
with militaries, wherher they be vis iring or indigenous. W h ile rherc are 
ch allenges to this coexistence, there have been success stories and rela-
tions are im proving constantly as borh sides starr ro bener understand 













m ine action response in the mission area. 
The MACC/FMAC manages and 
coordinates a full set of PKF demining assets. 
These assets c urren rly include a Kenyan 
Engineer Company, which consists of cwo 
human itarian-trained manual demining 
t roops; I a Slovakian dem ining company, 
which is made up of both a manual and a 
mechan ica l demining ca pacity; and a 
Bangladeshi dcmining company, which con-
sists of manual deminers as well as a mine 
detection dog (MDD) ream. In addition, rhe 
MACC employs MECHEM, a Sourh African 
civil ian conrracror, for road clearance opera-
t ions, as well as a n Emergency EOD field 
ream and rwo MRE field reams. 
T he prima1y ro le and responsib ility 
of rhe Force dcmin ing assets is ro support 
rhe mobiliry and safery of rhe PKF as well as ro 
provide specialist operational capability. Once 
demarcation commences, rhe mai n focus of 
work fo r rhe Force demining assets will be rhe 
clearance of roads and access routes ro pillar 
sires as well as clearance of the actual p illar sires 
along rhe delineated bo rder becween rhe two 
counrries. Currenr preparat ions for dem ining 
in support for demarcation inrend co deploy 
rhe Force demining assets as an imegrared 
operation, where all assets work alongside each 
other in a murually supportive manner. 
The Emergency EOD field ream is 
tasked to support the Force d emining assets in 
their effort to respond to immediate needs for 
disposing of UXO. Most commonly, UXO is 
discovered by members of the local popu la-
tion, who report these discoveries ro the 
MACC MRE field teams. The MRE reams 
are chen responsible for submitting the discov-
ery reports ro the MACC/FMAC headquar-
ters, including the MACC EOD ream. In 
mosr cases, rhe MACC EOD ream is subse-
q uently tasked ro d ispose of these UXO in rhe 
field. T he EOD ream and the MRE reams 
have an excellem and effective working coop-
eration, wh ich enables a quick response ro 
UXO d iscoveries. 
The MACC MRE reams regu larly 
deploy ro rhe rh ree sectors of rhe M ission area 
within rhe TSZ and adjacent areas, where they 
carry our community-level interventions, pro-
vid ing much-needed mine risk train ing to an 
average of 2,000 men, women and children 
per week. 
The MACC MRE personnel also 
conduct landmine safery training for mission 
personnel, both mil icary and civilian, and 
orher h uman itarian actors operating in 
Erit rea. 
In 2002, the MACC determined a 
need for a road verification/clearance capacity 
for locating presumably deep-buried mines 
and UXO and for increasing rhe safery of 
movement and mobil ity of the PKF and 
humanitarian operations in the TSZ. The flrsc 
co be contacted ro do this job was UXB Africa 
(Pry.) Ltd. 
During UXB's contract period until 
2003, che UNMEE MACC planned the oper-
ations and tasked che rouce clearance capaciry. 
In mid-2003, with the realisation char deep-
buried mines d id nor pose the threat that was 
initially assumed, rhe MACC recommended 
char the contract of UXB not be cxrcndcd. 
UXB concluded operations in Eritrea in mid-
July 2003. 
Jn mid-2003 , rhe roure clearance/ 
verification conrracr was relet, this rime to 
address the need co clear roads in support of 
the border demarcation process of rhe 
Ethiopian Ericrean Bound ary Commission 
(EEBC) more rapidly as well as to address rhe 
existing threat of newly laid mines (30 newly 
laid m ines on roads were reported in 18 
months) . This rime, the contract was awarded 
co MECH EM. MECHEM has three clear-
ance components: a mechanical ream, a man-




A ll mine accion tasks carried our by 
rhe Force demining assets are closely planned, 
coordi naced and supervised by the UNMEE 
MACC/FMAC. An experienced sec of boch 
civilian and military staff members of rhe 
MACC/FMAC is responsible for rhe receipt 
of casking requests, issuance of tasking orders, 
monitoring of tasks, implemencario n of quali-
ty assurance as well as supervision of activities 
in completion of task orders. 
The operations section of che 
MACC works alongside rhc FMAC. Three 
Liaison Officers (one from each demining 
contingent) work ar the FMAC. They are in 
charge of directly liaising and coordinating 
tasks char are issued by the MACC operations 
section. T hese officers report to rhe civilian 
Operations Officer of the MACC, who is 
responsible for rhe coordination of the assets 
and tasking priorities. 
In addition, chcre arc military 
officers working at the MACC/FMAC. These 
officers arc in fact UN Military Obse1vers 
(UNMOs) seconded to the MACC for specif-
ic assignments. For example, cwo UNMOs acr 
as FMAC MRE Officers; one acts as rhe 
Project Officer Dcmining for Demarcation; 
one aces as the Field Mine Action Liaison 
Officer; and one acts as the Mine Action 
Liaison Officer in Addis Ababa, Echiopia. In 
coral, there are currently five UNMOs second-
<::d ro the MACC in rank from Major ro 
Lieucenant Colonel. 
The civilian international staff of 
the MACC are predominantly ex-military 
staff from a variery of countries. The majority 
of chem have considerable demining and oper-
ational m anagement experience. At the 
MACC, they fi ll positions such as Programme 
Manager, C hief of Operations, O perations 
Officer, Regional Liaison Officers, EOD 
Officer, Chief of Informacion , Logistics 
Officer and Programme/Tra ining Officer. As 
a ream, they are responsible for the smooth 
functioning of the UNM EE MACC. 
The }'uture 
T he largest cask yet awamng rhe 
MACC/FMAC is the continuation of coordi-
nating clearance task~ of roads, access routes to 
pillar sires as well as pillar sites in Sectors 
Cemer and Wcsr to support rhe demarcation 
project of the EEBC. O riginally, it was intend-
ed that chis p roject would commence in 2003. 
However, due to rhe poli tical sralemare 
bccween the cwo countries concerning the 
delineation of their border, the EEBC has been 
unable to proceed with demarcation. As a 
result, the sires for pillars in Sectors Center and 
West of che TSZ remain undecided, holding 
back the Force assets to demine rhe necessary 
areas in preparation for marking rhe border. 
Pillar sites in Sector East have already been 
idencified and cleared in prepa ration fo r 
demarcation as chis was underway prior to che 
disagreement becween che two countries con-
cerning the way ahead of the EEBC. In the 
interim, while che international communiry 
anticipates an agreement becween Ethiopia 
and Eritrea concerning demarcation, rhe Force 
demining assets will continue to effectively 
conduct UNMEE and humanitarian clearance 
tasks in areas where populations are most 
affected by the chreat of mines and UXO. 
Currently, chis require ment is grearesr in the 




Since its inception, the MACC has coordinated, 
managed or supervised the following clearance opera-
tions: 
• Clearance of 51,058,794 sq m o f land 
• C learance of 9,2"'7 km of roads 
• D isposal of 3,739 AP mtncs 
• D isp osal of2,514 AT m ines and 48,256 items o f UXO 
These figures are the results of a combined military 
and civilian composite of demining operations since the 
beginning of the MACC through January 2004. They 
are a reflection of the commitment and cooperation to 
demining operations across the Mission area-an 
achievement that has been realised through joint efforts 
among contributing local authorities, NGOs and Force 
demining assets. 
Conclusion 
The integration of a MACC into a peacekeeping o peration 
has w itnessed a successful management of assets coupled with a unique 
skills base. This is rhe first rime in UN peacekeeping history that a 
peacekeeping mission has effectively incorporated into the establish-
ment of rhe mission structure an integrated civilian and m il itary mine 
action headquarters. This unprecedenced achievement has been 
accomplished in addicion co mine clearance of large areas of land in 
Eritrea and a significant reduction of the land mine and UXO threat 
for rhe local population. Being the first UN mine action establishment 
to effectively integrate all civilian and military mine action compo-
nents of a UN peacekeeping mission within a single headquarters 
structure, the UNMEE MACC has che potencial to se1ve as a template 
for che creation of futu re mine action centers that are parr of UN 
peacekeeping operations where a mine action element is required. 
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rhe needs and goals of rhe ocher. As John W ilkinson points o ut, " ... 
ic's che same rh ing, but d ifferent sides of rhe same coin,"3 and gening 
those rwo sides ro work in concert wirh one another is key to the 
progress of humanitarian demining and will undoubtedly benefit both 
as rhey work towards the murual objeccive of a world safe from mines 
and UXO. 
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